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ABSTRACT: Statistical evidence suggests that Army battalion commanders
are significant determinants of the retention of their lieutenants—especially
high-potential lieutenants. Further, this so-called Battalion Commander Effect
should be included in brigadier general promotion board assessments and used to
inform officer professional military education curricula.

A

n empirical analysis of 1,745 former US Army battalion commanders
and the 36,032 lieutenants who served under their command provides statistical
evidence for what many researchers have believed, anecdotally, for years: battalion
commanders significantly influence their lieutenants’ decision to stay in or leave the
Army. Moreover, the analysis shows this effect is even stronger on high-potential
lieutenants. Accordingly, battalion commanders should consider the effects of
their leadership on the junior officers in their formations, and the Army should
calculate and consider the battalion commander effect (BCE) when making
appropriate talent management decisions for senior officers. Ultimately, measuring
the BCE will enhance the Army’s overall assessment of leader effectiveness,
especially when used in conjunction with other newly emerging measures guiding
Army talent management.

Background
Consider two hypothetical newly commissioned lieutenants. At the completion
of the same Basic Officer Leadership Course, Second Lieutenant Smith and Second
Lieutenant Nguyen are assigned to different battalions on the same Army post.
During their three years as lieutenants in their first operational units, both Smith
and Nguyen serve under adequate yet unremarkable company commanders; however,
they have very different experiences with respect to their battalion commanders.
Smith’s battalion commander is an outstanding officer who cares deeply about others
and leads an exemplary personal life, much like the role model battalion commander
described in the seminal article, “The Subordinates.”1 In contrast, Nguyen’s battalion

1.

Dandridge Malone, “The Subordinates,” Army Magazine, December 1985, 16–25.
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commander frequently exhibits counterproductive leader behaviors and strained
personal relationships.
During their three years as lieutenants in their first battalions, Smith and
Nguyen demonstrate performance and potential—knowledge, skills, and
behaviors—at or near the top of their peer groups. As they prepare to depart
their first units, they receive orders to the Captains Career Course, the second
level of Army officer professional military education, and are promoted to the
rank of captain.
At this juncture, both officers face the most consequential professional
decision since joining the Army—should they stay in the Army? As they evaluate
their options, Smith and Nguyen might well reflect on the leadership and
examples set by their battalion commanders. Knowing their battalion commanders
are representative of other Army senior leaders, they might ask, “Do I want to
continue serving under leaders like my battalion commander?” Knowing people
grow more similar to those they spend time with, they might also ask, “Do I want
to become (a person like) my battalion commander?”
Fast forward two years. Thankfully, Smith and a majority of the 20 lieutenants
she served with in her first battalion chose to stay in the Army. She completed
the Captains Career Course, joined another unit, and will soon assume company
command. Most importantly, Smith remained in the talent pool from which
Army senior leaders are drawn. Unfortunately, Nguyen and a majority of the 20
lieutenants he served with in his first battalion chose to leave the Army, and the
Army lost their talents forever.
Although the Army’s top priority is its people, today’s Army does not reward
Smith’s battalion commander for her retention or hold Nguyen’s battalion
commander accountable for his loss. Consequently, the Army misses the
opportunity to spread the positive behaviors of Smith’s battalion commander
while Nguyen’s battalion commander remains on the fast track for promotions
and will likely continue his or her counterproductive behaviors, including driving
other top talent out of the Army. To avert such outcomes and better develop and
select future senior leaders, the Army must begin to measure and seriously consider
what we term the battalion commander effect.

Remaining in the Army
Prior research has shown battalion commander quality can predict the
performance of junior officers, but the impact of battalion commanders on
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their junior officers’ decisions to stay in the Army is less clear.2 A wide array of
research has shown many factors influence junior officer retention or attrition.3
Some lieutenants stay in the Army due to guaranteed pay and benefits, the officer
career education system, opportunities for diverse assignments, and frequent
leadership roles. Lieutenants who leave cite factors such as dissatisfaction with
long work hours and deployments, strains on personal life, frequent moves,
seniority-based promotions, and competitive job opportunities in the civilian
sector. Of note, most junior officers understand these structural factors before they
decide to join the Army.
Additionally, interpersonal factors such as relationships with peers and
subordinates are likely influential. People value serving with others who
enjoy their company, share their values, and hold similar interests; these and
other social factors influence this sense of belonging.4 Lieutenants’ direct
bosses—company commanders—are likely influential, as research has shown
that individuals stay in organizations when they have high-quality relationships
with their immediate supervisors and actively exchange value with their leaders.5
Still, other research has shown an employee’s job satisfaction and overall
performance increase when the employee sees his or her direct boss as an admirable
role model.6
Recent remarks by the Chief of Staff of the Army suggest battalion
commanders also affect junior officer retention and attrition: “That lieutenant
colonel influences 500 or 600 people, whether they want to stay in the Army
2. David S. Lyle and John Z. Smith, “The Effect of High-Performing Mentors on Junior Officer Promotion in the
US Army,” Journal of Labor Economics 32, no. 2 (April 2014): 229–58, https://doi.org/10.1086/673372.
3. Mark R. Lewis, “Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus,” Armed Forces & Society 31, no. 1
(Fall 2004): 63–93, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x0403100104; Susan Payne Carter et al., “Who’s the Boss?
The Effect of Strong Leadership on Employee Turnover,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 159
(March 2019): 323–43, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.028; and The Army Training and Leader
Development Panel, Officer Study Report to the Army (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army,
June 30, 2003): OS-8, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a415810.pdf.
4. Herminia Ibarra, “Provisional Selves: Experimenting with Image and Identity in Professional
Adaptation,” Administrative Science Quarterly 44, no. 4 (December 1999): 764–91, https://doi.org/10.2307
/2667055; George B. Graen, “Role-Making Processes within Complex Organizations,” in Handbook of
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. Marvin D. Dunnette (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), 1245;
and George Graen and James F. Cashman, “A Role-Making Model of Leadership in Formal Organizations:
A Developmental Approach,” in Leadership Frontiers, eds. James G. Hunt and Lars L. Larson (Kent, OH:
Kent State University Press, 1975), 143–65.
5. Bernard M. Bass with Ruth Bass, The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial
Applications, 4th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2008); Veronica M. Godshalk and John J. Sosik, “Mentoring
and Leadership: Standing at the Crossroads of Theory, Research, and Practice,” in The Handbook of Mentoring
at Work: Theory, Research, and Practice, ed. Belle Rose Ragins and Kathy E. Kram (Los Angeles: Sage
Publications, 2007), 150; Heather K. Spence Laschinger, Nancy Purdy, and Joan Almost, “The Impact of
Leader-Member Exchange Quality, Empowerment, and Core Self-Evaluation on Nurse Manager’s Job
Satisfaction,” Journal of Nursing Administration 37, no. 5 (May 2007): 221–29, https://doi.org/10.1097/01
.NNA.0000269746.63007.08; and K. Michele Kacmar et al., “The Interactive Effect of Leader-Member
Exchange and Communication Frequency on Performance Ratings,” Journal of Applied Psychology 88, no. 4
(2003): 764–72, https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.4.764.
6. Gregory A. Rich, “The Sales Manager as a Role Model: Effects on Trust, Job Satisfaction, and
Performance of Salespeople,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 25 (September 1997): 319–28,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0092070397254004.
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or get out of the Army. It’s a level of leadership that I think is the most
important. . . . If you look at officers who may have gotten out [of the Army] early,
you ask them how their battalion commander was, it was probably not who they
wanted or inspired them to serve.”7 Yet apart from an abundance of anecdotal
evidence, little was previously known about the impact of battalion commanders
on junior officer retention and attrition.
Even though company commanders spend more time with lieutenants
due to proximity, there are several reasons why battalion commanders may be
more influential. Battalion commanders have the sole right to approve or deny
promotion to first lieutenant. Additionally, the demographics of battalion
commanders make them stand out. While a company commander usually leads
4 to 7 lieutenants, a battalion commander normally leads 14 to 35. Battalion
commanders are approximately 15 years older than their lieutenants, 10 years
older than their company commanders, and often referred to as the unit’s “old
man” or “old lady.” Indeed, battalion commanders are at, or near, retirement
age—the Army’s equivalent of AT&T and General Motors “company men
and women.” And they are elite. While the Army practically guarantees officers
company command, only 25 percent of officers who remain in service for 18 years
will ultimately be selected for battalion command.

[My battalion commander] cared about his lieutenants. He asked us, “What are
your career goals, what do you want to do next, what can we do to keep you in?”
—Former lieutenant

Therefore, from the junior officers’ perspective, battalion commanders are
carefully positioned partners in the Army enterprise, and the Army considers
them to be models of the organization’s values. As the Chief of Staff of the Army
recently noted, battalion commanders’ organizational authority, influence over
command climate, and extensive experience give them an “out-sized ability to
shape the future service of the soldiers they lead.”8
Since battalion commanders have significant influence on their lieutenants’
career outcomes and are conspicuous examples of what the Army develops and
rewards in its leaders, this study hypothesized that battalion commanders would,
7. Christopher Woody, “The US Army Is Thinking about the Threat of Nuclear War Again and Wants
to Make Sure It Has the Right People to Deal with It,” Business Insider, January 17, 2020, https://www
.businessinsider.com/army-revamps-personnel-management-amid-turn-to-great-power-competition-2020-1.
8. James C. McConville and J. P. McGee, “Battalion Commanders Are the Seed Corn of the Army,” War on
the Rocks, December 23, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/battalion-commanders-are-the-seed-corn
-of-the-army/.
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on average, significantly affect their lieutenants’ decisions to stay in or leave the
Army. The study aimed to estimate and understand the BCE of these leaders,
which would enable the Army to improve its senior officer talent management—
both individually and collectively.

Research Methods
The researchers conducted a statistical analysis designed to test the hypothesis
that battalion commanders influence their lieutenants’ future decisions to remain
in or leave the Army. The study team accessed the Army’s officer personnel
database, with permission of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis,
Department of the Army G-1. Since 1991, the Army has logged a monthly
database entry for each of its officers, including active-duty status, rank, assigned
unit (specific battalion, recorded by its six-digit unit identification code),
demographics, and some military school qualifications.
To limit variance in the analysis, the study included only traditional deployable
battalions of the 1990s and early 2000s. Current and historical organizational
documents were used to identify the name and six-digit unit identification code
for each active-duty battalion. Next, the Army’s electronic personnel database
was used to identify the lieutenant colonel assigned to each of these battalions
during each month. Finally, the database was searched for second and first
lieutenants who served in the same unit during one or more of the same months as
one or more of the previously identified battalion commanders.
The study did not include aviation battalions (due to the longer service
obligation), battalions that were moving home locations due to Base Realignment
and Closure actions, or battalion commanders who supervised fewer than 10 or
more than 60 lieutenants. In total, the study’s dataset included 265 deployable
battalions, 1,745 battalion commanders, and the 36,032 lieutenants who served
under them.
The study then defined the retention point that best signifies a lieutenant
staying in the Army past his or her initial obligation. Depending on commissioning
source, new lieutenants have three-year (Officer Candidate School [OCS] and
Reserve Officer Training Corps [ROTC] nonscholarship), four-year (ROTC
scholarship), or five-year (United States Military Academy [USMA]) active-duty
service obligations. When junior officers decide to separate from the Army at
the end of their obligation, they may not leave immediately; instead they often
wait until an optimal transitional point, such as one coinciding with a graduate
school start date, a significant family/life event, or a civilian job offer. Yet almost
all officers who intend to separate from the Army early in their career do so before
assuming company command, which typically happens during an 18-month
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period between the fifth and eighth year of an officer’s active-duty service. To
account for the varying active-duty service obligations and idiosyncratic decision
timing against the additional time commitment of company command, the
study defined the retention point as the end of an officer’s sixth year of service,
since very few officers would have completed company command by that time.
The study then employed a multivariable regression statistical model to
test the hypothesis that battalion commanders affect their lieutenants’ decisions
to remain in or leave the Army. The dependent variable was defined as a
lieutenant remaining in the Army past the sixth year of service, and the first
explanatory variable was defined as the battalion commander under whom the
lieutenant served. Although every junior officer’s retention decision is individual
and influenced by many factors, the sheer size of the dataset produced a high
degree of confidence in the results, particularly once the regression included
control variables like the lieutenant’s year group (which accounts for strength of
economy and Army-wide trends), branch, duty location (post), commissioning
source, gender, race/ethnicity, age, undergraduate institution quality, marital
and child status, and graduation from Airborne, Air Assault, or Ranger Schools.
This model enabled the study to measure each battalion commander’s
unique predictive effect on the retention decision of the average lieutenant who
served under him or her. The empirical results were as expected: some battalion
commanders have a positive influence, some have a negative influence, and others
have a negligible influence. Yet we wanted to test whether battalion commanders,
on average, influenced their junior officers’ retention and attrition in a significant
way. The study, therefore, applied a more-complex regression analysis that
measured the average effect of all 1,745 battalion commanders in predicting
their 36,032 junior officers’ decisions to stay or go. The results revealed—with a
99.9 percent confidence level—a significant battalion commander effect on the
Army’s retention of lieutenants.

[My battalion commander] was degrading. The best lieutenants in the battalion got
out. They could not stand his oppressive and demeaning behavior. By and large, most
lieutenants got out.
—Former lieutenant

To further test for this effect, the researchers ran a series of additional
regressions to compare the explanatory power of the battalion commander to the
explanatory power of the study’s 13 control variables. The results showed that the
identity of the battalion commander explained at least 22 percent and 58 percent
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more of the lieutenants’ retention decisions than any of the control variables, in
terms of main effects and incremental effects, respectively (measured with the
adjusted R2 statistic). This finding infers that the battalion commander may be
the most impactful factor in a typical lieutenant’s decision to stay or go.
But other leaders in the formation matter as well. Lieutenants’ platoon
sergeants, company commanders, and field-grade officers likely also exert
influence on retention decisions. The study’s empirical design, like Army culture,
implicitly holds battalion commanders responsible for the entire leadership
culture in their units. Consequently, the study conducted additional empirical
tests to see if other characteristics of the battalion, such as the other leaders who
influence the lieutenants and the traditions and culture not influenced by the
battalion commander, were more influential in explaining the retention pattern of
its lieutenants than the battalion commanders.
To test this finding for fixed effects of the battalion (influence from the battalion
not related to the battalion commander), the study added a battalion dummy
variable to the regression as an additional explanatory variable. Yet the study still
found that the battalion commanders’ variable remained statistically significant
while the battalion dummy variable did not. The analysis, therefore, indicates
battalion commanders, on average, may have more influence on the Army’s
retention of lieutenants than other battalion-level effects, such as other leaders in
the battalion.
Next, the study considered nuances from different types of battalion
commanders and lieutenants. Since a lieutenant can serve under several
battalion commanders, the study tested the relative influence of each battalion
commander and found the battalion commander under whom the junior officer
served the longest was more predictive than the order (first, second, or third)
of the commander. This finding is logical due to the likely increase in interaction
and observation in these relationships.9 The study then tested if the BCE was
different for officers from the three major commissioning sources. By running
three additional regressions, each regression conditional on the lieutenants
being commissioned by USMA, ROTC, or OCS, the study found an interesting
distinction. On average, the battalion commander effect is significant for ROTC
and USMA lieutenants, but not for OCS lieutenants.
This variance could result from the fact many OCS officers are prior enlisted
soldiers with experience serving under several battalion commanders, and who
are therefore more resilient under various qualities of leadership. Also, since
OCS officers are, on average, closer to retirement age than their ROTC and
9. Robert F. Bornstein, “Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968–1987,”
Psychological Bulletin 106, no. 2 (1989): 265–89, https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.106.2.265.
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USMA peers, they have higher incentives to stay in the Army, and their retention
decision would correspondingly be less influenced by the identity of their
battalion commander.
Since the study previously matched each battalion commander with his or her
junior officers, each junior officer’s total length of service under each battalion
commander can be measured. Also, the study assumed a junior officer who served
under a battalion commander for a shorter period was less affected than one who
served under the same battalion commander for a longer period. Accordingly,
the study weighted the value of each junior officer retention decision in
proportion to the number of months the lieutenant served under that battalion
commander. Statistically, the study measured the BCE as the percentage of a
battalion commander’s junior officers who remained in the Army long enough to
command a company, weighted by the number of months each junior officer served
under the battalion commander.

B C Ej =

n


i=1

Mi ∗ [1(if LT retained past 6 years), 0(if not)]
n


i=1

Mi

M = months serving under battalion commander j
i = LT who served under battalion commander j

Figure 1. The battalion commander effect equation

Running this equation (figure 1) on each of the 1,745 battalion commanders,
the study found the average (mean, or µ) battalion commander had a BCE
n

Mi ∗ [1(ifdeviation
LT retained
years), 0(if
of 59 percent with ai=1standard
(σ) past
of 136 percent.
Thatnot)]
is, the average
BCE
=
j
n
battalion commander in the study retained 59
percent
of
his
or
her
lieutenants,
Mi
i=1
and most battalion commanders retained between 46 percent and 72 percent
M = months
serving under
j their lieutenants. The range
(each one standard
deviation
frombattalion
the commander
mean) of
of the battalioni =commanders’
BCE
was
striking.
Some battalion commanders
LT who served under
battalion
commander
j
had a BCE of less than 20 percent while some were over 90 percent. If the
study assumes the sample of 1,745 battalion commanders is representative of
Army battalion commanders in general, then the 500-plus battalion commanders
with a BCE of less than 46 percent or greater than 72 percent are unusual.

Retaining High-Potential Lieutenants
This project’s previous analysis calculated the battalion commander effect
with the underlying assumption that all lieutenants have equal potential. But
1
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this assumption is erroneous. Since the new Army People Strategy recognizes each
person’s unique combination of knowledge, skills, behaviors, and preferences,
the BCE could be customized to better reflect a comprehensive talent management
approach.10 More specifically, some lieutenants are higher performing and
likely have more potential, while others do not display the minimal knowledge,
skills, and behaviors needed to serve as effective company commanders. Since
previous research has found lieutenants with higher ability respond differently
to leader influence, examining how well a battalion commander’s lieutenant
retention pattern matches the actual potential of his or her junior officers could
produce greater insights.11
To accomplish this goal, the Army could measure and use a version
of the battalion commander effect that accounts for high-potential
(HIPO) lieutenants—the BCEHIPO. Assuming an officer evaluation
report is an accurate (valid) classification of a lieutenant’s potential, each
lieutenant’s report profile, now available electronically, could be coded as a
high-, moderate-, or low-potential officer. For example, if at least
66.7 percent of a lieutenant’s evaluation reports were rated “most qualified”
by their senior raters, he or she could be coded as high-potential. If 66.6
to 33.3 percent of the reports were “most qualified,” he or she could be coded
as moderate-potential. If 33.2 percent or fewer of the evaluation reports
were “most qualified,” he or she could be coded as low-potential.
After each junior officer was coded as high-, moderate-, or lowpotential, the BCE formula could be changed to give the battalion
commander positive credit if each lieutenant’s retention decision was
most advantageous to the Army (if a high- or moderate-potential
junior officer retains or if a low-potential junior officer leaves) and
no credit if that decision was least advantageous to the Army (if a
high- or moderate-potential junior officer departs or if a low-potential
junior officer remains in the Army). In other words, if all of a battalion
commander’s high- and moderate-potential lieutenants chose to stay in the
Army, and all of his or her low-potential lieutenants departed the Army
before company command, the battalion commander would have a BCE HIPO
rating of 100 percent.
Other ways to code lieutenants as HIPO might include factors such as
performance in the basic and career officer courses, order of merit at their
commissioning sources (such as distinguished military graduate designations),
or the quality of their undergraduate institutions. Since the Army is
10. Ryan D. McCarthy, James C. McConville, and Michael A. Grinston, The Army People Strategy
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2019).
11. Carter et al., “Who’s the Boss?”
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generally better off when all junior officers want to stay on active duty,
an additional way to calculate the BCE HIPO would be to give battalion
commanders credit for all junior officers who stay, but give more weight to
the high-potential junior officers than the moderate- or lower-potential ones.
Since high-potential lieutenants are likely to find more attractive options in
the civilian workforce (and thus are more likely to decide to stay in the Army
because they want to), the study hypothesizes battalion commanders have
even more influence on their high-potential lieutenants’ retention decisions
than on those of moderate-potential or low-potential lieutenants.
To test this hypothesis empirically, lieutenants were coded as HIPOs using
available data: those who graduated from USMA, from an ROTC program
at a highly competitive undergraduate institution, or as a distinguished
military graduate of their ROTC or OCS cohort. In all, 12,239 (37.9 percent)
of the 36,032 lieutenants were classified as high-potential officers. Running
the regression equation again for only HIPO lieutenants, the study found the
identity of the battalion commander explains more of the variance in
high-potential lieutenants’ retention decisions than it does for average and
non-HIPO lieutenants.

Figure 2. Battalion commander effect distribution (BCE and BCEHIPO, n=1,745)

Additionally, BCEHIPO has a wider distribution than BCE (figure 2), which
would be expected if the BCEHIPO is stronger. For example, just one battalion
commander had a BCE of less than 10 percent, but 55 battalion commanders
had a BCEHIPO of less than 10 percent. Ultimately, the evidence strongly suggests
battalion commanders have even more influence over their high-potential
lieutenants’ decisions to stay or go. Measuring BCEHIPO, therefore, may be even
more important to effective Army talent management.
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Senior Officer Talent Management
Developing Future Battalion Commanders
By making the battalion commander effect official, the Army could clearly
signal to all officers that it places great weight on their ability to develop
subordinates, which will likely catalyze positive, thoughtful leader behavior in
battalion commanders across the service. The mere awareness that their BCE is
being calculated and potentially viewed by senior leaders would shape the behavior
of future and current battalion commanders, or at least increase those commanders’
awareness of their responsibility to nourish future leaders.
Developing Former Battalion Commanders
The BCE provides a wide range of options and contexts to reinforce and
spread positive leadership behaviors while also identifying and reducing
counterproductive ones. For example, when a former battalion commander
presents a very high or very low BCE (perhaps beyond one standard deviation
from the mean), the Army should check his or her Army Commander
Evaluation Tool (ACET) results, an existing 21-question peer and subordinate
evaluation administered by the US Army Combined Arms Center’s School for
Command Preparation.
Battalion commanders with a high BCE, strong positive ACET feedback,
and high organizational performance are likely the best in the Army. They
should be publicly acknowledged, rewarded, and presented as role models
for others. Officers with low a BCE and negative ACET feedback likely have
deep challenges, but may still have potential. They could be put into a four- to
six-month special leadership development program, with goals to become
self-aware of counterproductive behaviors such as toxicity or apathy. Such
mentorship programs could be led by a retired general officer with a high
BCE and high organizational performance. Upon completion, officers who do
not demonstrate significant behavioral changes could be thanked for their
service and asked to submit their retirements. Those who show increased
self-awareness and positive behavioral changes could be encouraged to remain
on active duty. Only those who demonstrate transformational behavioral change
should be given the opportunity to compete for a future command.
Informing Selection for Senior Officer Talent Management
Additional relevant information leads to better talent management decisions;
consequently, the Army has created several new programs designed to better match
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its officer talent with the talent profile required, such as the talent marketplace.12
Further, the Army has started gathering more information about the skills of its
officers, such as their communication ability, strategic potential, and mental and
physical fitness, during its new command assessment programs.
Due to the career timelines of the most junior lieutenants in a battalion, the
Army must wait up to five-and-a-half years after battalion commanders depart
their commands before it can calculate their full BCE and BCEHIPO. Considering
this lag, the Army could examine ACETs and climate surveys from officers’ time
in command to provide similar feedback to the senior service (war) college
selection board, colonels promotion board, and colonels command assessment
program (CCAP, which already considers ACETs).
To better inform these colonel-level selection boards and program, the
Army should calculate an interim BCE and BCEHIPO each year after a battalion
commander departs command. This data should be considered by the CCAP,
within the context of it still being incomplete. Certainly, each former battalion
commander’s full BCE and BCEHIPO should be calculated and strongly considered
by what is perhaps the Army’s most important leader selection event—
the brigadier general selection board.
Shaping Institutional-Level Leader Development
The battalion commander effect is also a potentially powerful tool for
improving Army leadership training and development. The Army should further
analyze the ACETs and climate surveys of officers with very high and very
low BCEs to identify the specific leader behaviors shown to be consistent with
their scores. These behaviors could then be taught as evidence-driven examples
of best and counterproductive leadership practices at pre-command courses and
all officer education schools. To further reinforce the message, the Army could
establish an annual battalion commander-level award informed by the BCE or
BCEHIPO, similar to the Army’s current General Douglas MacArthur Leadership
Award given to outstanding company-grade officers.
Additionally, calculating the battalion commander effect for each
battalion commander will allow the Army to see the developmental routes—
schools, assignments, interventions—that tend to produce battalion commanders
with high and low BCEs with corresponding organizational performance. By
examining these patterns, the Army could redesign its officer assignment system
to maximize developmental paths that yield high BCE, high organizational
performance officers.
12. Gautam Mukunda, Indispensable: When Leaders Really Matter (Boston: Harvard Business Review
Press, 2012).
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Limitations
While the battalion commander effect should be considered in senior officer
talent management decisions, it should not be the sole information source about
an officer’s past leadership or potential. Several contextual factors are needed to
interpret its meaning properly. First, it is easy to imagine a battalion commander who
practices “likership” more than quality leadership, resulting in a high BCE when
positive leadership such as “tough love” was absent. Second, a counterproductive—
toxic or ineffective—battalion commander’s negative effect could be mitigated
by a group of high-quality field- and company-grade officers and NCOs, with
the battalion commander ending up with a high BCE for which he or she is
not responsible.
Third, a battalion may have had a commander who was a very effective and
thoughtful leader, yet the battalion experienced an extremely difficult deployment,
or its lieutenants had to make their retention decisions during a particularly strong
economy with high-paying civilian job opportunities. Finally, one could imagine
a battalion commander who receives a cohort of lieutenants who are of unusually
high or low quality or predisposed to want to stay in or leave the Army. Therefore,
the battalion commander effect is just one of several important measures of
leadership effectiveness, including 360-degree feedback, command climate surveys,
reenlistment rates for junior enlisted personnel, unit conduct, and unit performance
at centralized training events.

Conclusion
The Army needs quality leadership, and it expects its officers to provide that
leadership consistently within the constraints of the institution. As the Army looks
for ways to retain talent, the battalion commander effect should play a role. While
officer evaluation reports capture supervisors’ perceptions of their subordinates’
leadership performance and potential, the BCE is an objective measure of leader
effectiveness by utilizing subordinates’ decisions to vote with their feet. In essence,
the battalion commander effect provides support for the notion that “people do not
quit organizations; they quit leaders.”13
When taken in context, the battalion commander effect is an important way to
identify the presence of counterproductive leader behaviors in a way performance
evaluations may not. Officers who are effective at managing the perceptions of their

13. Grace E. Mills, “Transformational Leadership and Employee Retention: An Exploratory Investigation of
the Four Characteristics” (doctoral diss., Capella University, 2007), 1.
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seniors while abusing or disregarding their juniors will likely ace official evaluation
reports, but they will be held accountable by the BCE.
Ultimately, the battalion commander effect is a new measure of leadership
effectiveness that should be calculated and considered, within context, when making
senior officer talent management decisions. In doing so, the Army will improve its
brigadier general selection process, better understand the developmental experiences
that produce officers who inspire retention, and send an unmistakable message to
current and future battalion commanders that they will be held accountable for
the retention or attrition of its most critical asset, its young talent, and especially its
high-potential lieutenants. Additionally, since leadership in a military context has
many similarities to leadership in civilian settings, a modified BCE could inform the
selection of the first tenured-level supervisors in other contexts, such as not-for-profit
senior directors, law firm partners, corporate general managers, and consulting and
banking executives.
In the words of retired Army Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr.,
the former III Corps commander and former president and CEO of the
Center for Creative Leadership, “battalion commanders—even more powerfully
than division commanders—craft the organizational climates that motivate or
discourage lieutenants . . . and everybody else.”14 The BCE can measure that aspect
of leadership objectively, powerfully, and reliably, giving the Army a new tool to
help create an organizational climate that will maximize both its current and
future effectiveness.
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